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Abstract
This note discusses the influence of state ownership on optimal export taxes. We demonstrate
an invariance theorem: the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially
optimal export levels nor welfare nor the level of optimal trade taxes.
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Although a lot of state-owned enterprises have been privatized or partially
privatized in the last decades, state ownership still plays an important role
in most economies. The OECD (2005) reports that state-owned enterprises
make up to 10 % of employment and up to 50 % of market capitalization
in some OECD countries. Furthermore, a lot of ﬁrms are owned jointly by
private agents and the government. We will label these partially state-owned
ﬁrms as mixed enterprises. These mixed enterprises co-exist with private ﬁrms
in a lot of industries, and the role of state ownership has been investigated in
much detail empirically in a closed economy framework.1
The international trade literature, however, has by and large ignored the
role of mixed enterprises. The few exceptions have either considered the
degree of partial ownership and/or the role of tariﬀs and production subsidies.2
None of the papers has considered the case that both mixed enterprises and
private ﬁrms may export from the same country to another country. In this
note, we consider this case of export policies in a model à la Rodrik (1989).
We use a standard model for the behavior of mixed enterprises which we
borrow from the closed economy literature. This literature assumes that a
mixed enterprise maximizes a weighted sum of social welfare and proﬁts, so
a completely state-owned ﬁrm would maximize social welfare only.3 Under
this assumption, we demonstrate that neither the optimal export tax nor the
optimal outputs depend on the degree of state ownership.
1See, for example, Boardman and Vining (1989), Boardman, Laurin and Vining (2002),
D’Souza and Megginson (1999), Kole and Mulherin (1997) and Kwoka (2005).
2See Chang (2005, 2007), Chao and Yu (2006), Fershtman (1990), Fjell and Pal (1996),
Matsumura (1998), Pal and White (1998, 2003).
3See Bös (1991), Matsumura (1998), Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2003), and Matsumura
and Kanda (2005).
12 The model
Two domestic ﬁrms, 1 and 2, produce a homogeneous good and export their
entire outputs, q1 and q2, to a foreign country that does not produce the good.
They have identical marginal cost, c.4 Let Q = q1+q2. The foreign country’s
import demand function is P = P(Q),w h e r eP(0) >cand P0(Q) < 0.I t
is well known that the rivalry of the two domestic ﬁrms implies that the
h o m ec o u n t r ya saw h o l eo v e r p r o d u c e sa n dt h u sf a i l st oe x p l o i ti t sp o t e n t i a l
m o n o p o l yp o w e ri nt h ef o r e i g nm a r k e t . I ft h eh o m ec o u n t r yc o u l dd i r e c t l y
control the outputs of the domestic ﬁrms, it will choose Q to maximize social
welfare, which is the export revenue minus the production cost:
W = P(Q)Q − cQ. (1)
The socially optimal industry output, denoted by Q∗, must therefore equate






As usual, we assume that the second order condition is satisﬁed. Let us
start with the standard case of two domestic ﬁrms which are privately owned.
Suppose that direct control is not possible. The home government can choose
an export tax t to inﬂuence the quantity exported. Assume the ﬁrms behave
as Cournot rivals, and that each wants to maximize its proﬁt. Firm i’s proﬁt
function (net of tax) is
e πi = P(qi + q−i)qi − cqi − tqi. (3)
The ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm i is
P
0(qi + q−i)qi + P(qi + q−i)=c + t for i =1 ,2. (4)
4As long as international markets are segmented and marginal costs are constant, it
does not matter whether a domestic demand exists or not because the optimal export tax
does not depend on domestic demand. See Rodrik (1989).
2Assume that the second-order condition is satisﬁed, i.e.,f o ra l lqi ∈ [0,Q] and
for all Q>0, P00(Q)qi +2 P0(Q) < 0. The Cournot equilibrium outputs are
denoted by qC













C(t)) = 2(c + t)
To ensure that QC(t) coincides with the socially optimal output Q∗,t h eg o v -





∗) > 0. (5)
because this tax rate makes each ﬁrm i produce the quantity qi = Q∗/2:F i r m
i t a k e sa sg i v e nt h et a xr a t et∗ and the output of the other ﬁrm, which is













Clearly, by choosing qi = Q∗/2,t h eﬁrm satisﬁes this condition. This argu-
ment also applies to the other ﬁrm. It follows that, in a Cournot equilibrium
with the export tax rate t∗, the equilibrium industry output is identical to
the socially optimal output.5
3 Mixed duopoly
Consider now the case where one ﬁrm is a mixed enterprise and has the
objective function of maximizing a weighted average of its own proﬁt e π1,a s
given by (3), and the home country’s welfare W, as given by (1), with weights
1 − θ and θ, respectively. In this context, we ask the following questions:
5Eq. (5) coincides with Rodrik’s (1989) optimal export tax for the case of only two
ﬁrms.
3should the export tax rates be diﬀe r e n tf o rt h et w oﬁrms, and should they
depend on θ? Our answer for each of these questions is “no” ˙ We now proceed
to prove this “invariance theorem”. Since the good is not consumed in the
home country, social welfare is just the export revenue minus production cost.
Thus ﬁrm 1’s problem is:
max
q1
(1 − θ)[P(q1 + q2)q1 − cq1 − tq1]+θ[P(q1 + q2)(q1 + q2) − c(q1 + q2)].
We assume that ﬁrm 1 takes t and q2 as given and may derive the following
invariance result:
Proposition 1 The social optimum can be achieved as a Nash equilibrium
by applying the optimal export tax (5). The optimal export tax is independent
of the parameter θ that represents the degree of public ownership. The socially
optimal output of each ﬁrm is independent of θ.
Proof: Suppose that the government sets the same t∗ as in the standard
duopoly case (see eq. (5)), and suppose that ﬁrm 2 chooses q2 = Q∗/2 as
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Now, clearly, if ﬁrm 1 chooses q1 = Q∗/2, then expression (I) is zero, because t∗
satisﬁes (5), and expression (II) is also zero, because Q∗ satisﬁes (2). Therefore







4which is also satisﬁed. It remains to check that ﬁrm 2,b yc h o o s i n gq2 =
Q∗/2, also satisﬁes its own ﬁrst- and second-order condition. This follows
immediately from (6). ¤
Proposition 1 is a surprising and important result. Its intuition can be
best explained by considering the case of a completely state-owned ﬁrm. This
ﬁrm would maximize welfare, and any tax, including the optimal export tax,
would not inﬂuence its behavior because government tax revenues and the
ﬁrm’s tax bills cancel out for welfare. Hence, given that the privately owned
ﬁrm produces half of the socially optimal output, a completely state-owned
ﬁrms would also produce half of the socially optimal output. Proposition 1
demonstrates that the optimal tax guarantees also that any partially state-
owned ﬁrm will keep this level as it has no incentive to produce less or more.
Obviously, Proposition 1 can be generalized to the case of n domestic ﬁrms
that are Cournot rivals, of which m<nﬁrms are mixed enterprises.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k
This note has shown that state ownership does not change optimal export
taxes. Furthermore, we have shown that the degree of state ownership aﬀects
neither the level of socially optimal exports nor the export and the import
country’s welfare levels themselves. Hence, state ownership does neither help
n o rh i n d e re x p o r tp o l i c i e s .
References
[1] Bárcena-Ruiz, J.C. and M.B. Garzón, 2003, “International Trade and
Strategic Privatization”, Review of Development Economics, 9, 502-513.
[2] Boardman, A.E. and A.R. Vining, 1989, “Ownership and Performance
in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Pri-
5vate, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises”, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 32, 1-33.
[3] Boardman, A.E., C. Laurin and A.R. Vining, 2002, “Privatization in
Canada: Operating and stock price performance with international com-
parisons”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 19, 137-154.
[4] Bös, D., 1991, “Privatization and restructuring: An incomplete-contract
approach”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 155,
362-382.
[5] Chang, W.W., 2005, “Optimal Trade and Privatization Policies in an
International Duopoly with Cost Asymmetry”, Journal of International
Trade and Economic Development, 14, 19-42.
[6] Chang, W.W., 2007, “Optimal trade, industrial, and privatization poli-
cies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives”, Journal
of International trade and Economic Development, 16, 31-52.
[7] Chao, C. and E.S.H. Yu, 2006, “Partial Privatization, Foreign Compe-
tition, and Optimum Tariﬀ”, Review of International Economics, 14,
87-92.
[8] D’Souza, J. and W.L. Megginson, 1999, “The ﬁnancial and operating
performance of privatized ﬁrms during the 1990s”, Journal of Finance,
54, 1397-1438.
[9] Fershtman, C., 1990, “The Interdependence Between Owership Status
and Market Structure: The Case of Privatization”, Economica, 57, 319-
28.
[10] Fjell, K. and D. Pal, 1996, “Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign
Private Firms”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, 737-43.
6[11] Kole, S.R. and J.H. Mulherin, 1997, “The government as a shareholder:
A case from the United States”, Journal of Law and Economics, 40,
1-22.
[12] Kwoka, J.E., 2005, “The comparative advantage of public ownership:
evidence from US electric utilities”, Canadian Journal of Economics,
38, 622-640.
[13] Laﬀont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement
and Regulation,C a m b r i d g e ,M A ,M I TP r e s s .
[14] Matsumura, T., 1998, “Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly”, Jour-
nal of Public Economics, 70, 473-83.
[15] Matsumura, T. and O. Kanda, 2005, “Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry
Markets”, Journal of Economics, 84, 27-48.
[16] OECD, 2005, Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises, A Sur-
vey of OECD Countries,P a r i s .
[17] Pal, D. and M.D. White, 1998, “Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, and
Strategic Trade Policy”, Southern Economic Journal, 65, 264-81.
[18] Pal, D. and M.D. White, 2003, “Intra-industry Trade and Strategic
Trade Policy in the Presence of Public Firms”, International Economic
Journal, 17, 29-41.
[19] Rodrik, D., 1989, “Optimal Trade Taxes for a Large Country with Non-
Atomistic Firms,” Journal of International Economics, 26, 157-167.
7